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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
RONALD MORELLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 950821-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a 1983 conviction of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court,.$alt 
Lake County, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
and 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is defendant's claim barred by his 12-year delay in challenging his guilty plea 
and the intervening destruction of the reporter's notes of the plea hearing? 
This issue presents a question of law which this Court will review for correctness. 
State v. Perm, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The trial court's factual findings will be 
reviewed deferentially under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Id. at 935-36. 
2. Has defendant demonstrated by reference to the information, probable cause 
statement, and plea affidavit that his 1983 guilty plea was not taken in substantial 
compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
An appellate court will "review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The trial court's findings of fact made in 
* conjunction with its decision will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." State 
v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case requires interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (1982), 
containing rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. A copy of this provision is 
attached as addendum G. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery by information filed 14 April 1983 
(R. 7, addendum A). He was at the time a federal prisoner (R. 4). Defendant waived his 
preliminary hearing and, on 20 May 1983, pled guilty to aggravated robbery (R. 4, 10). 
2 
He was sentenced to a term of five years to life to run concurrently with his federal prison 
term (R. 10, 13-14, addendum C). 
On 13 March 1995 defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 5-8).] 
Defendant's appointed counsel filed an Amended Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (R. 21-23, 
addendum D). After hearing, the district court denied the motion and entered findings, 
conclusions, and an order (R. 32-37, addendum E-F). Defendant timely appealed (R. 38). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Crime2 
On 28 April 1982, defendant entered the O.C. Tanner jewelry store in downtown Salt 
Lake City and told Allison Van Vranken, a salesperson, that he wanted to purchase diamonds 
for his wife (R. 8). She showed him an assortment of diamonds, which he viewed under 
a microscope; he then left the store (id.). 
Defendant returned the following day and asked Van Vranken to show him a pendant, 
a ring, and a large diamond she had shown him the day before (id.). Defendant then stood 
up and opened his coat, displaying the handle of a pistol tucked in his waistband. He said, 
1
 The record numbering is inconsistent, with different record pages bearing the same 
number. The confusion is compounded by the fact that, on the same date defendant 
filed his motion to withdraw, he filed a complaint against the Utah Board of Pardons 
(see R. 1-3). That complaint is unrelated to the present appeal, but filed in the same 
district court file. 
2
 Since no preliminary hearing or trial was held below, this statement of facts is 
based wholly upon the probable cause statement attached to the information. 
3 
"Don't scream or I'll shoot; [djon't follow me or I'll shoot; [d]on't follow me, there is a 
woman in the store and she will shoot" (id.). He then grabbed the diamonds and left (id.). 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea3 
Defendant apparently completed his federal prison sentence (R. 64-65). He expected 
that the Utah Board of Pardons "would be satisfied with that" and "probably parole him 
at or near the termination" of his federal sentence (R. 65). Instead, they held a parole hearing, 
set a parole date of 2008, and imposed restitution of $66,000, apparently as a condition of 
parole (R. 34,61,65). Defendant responded with this motion to withdraw his plea (R. 65). 
Among the findings of the district court on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea are the following: 
3. That the Board of Pardons has set restitution in connection with defendant's 
commitment, as recoupment for the value of property stolen, at approximately 
sixty-six thousand dollars ($66,000). 
4. That the record of the allocution [sic] in open court during the hearing, 
wherein defendant entered his plea of guilty, no longer exists as the notes from 
the court reporter have been destroyed by the court clerk[']s office. Consequently 
no transcript of proceedings can be produced. 
5. That the Affidavit of Defendant, executed by defendant before the court 
on the date the plea was entered[,] is available and has been reviewed by the court. 
6. That there is no record of any discussion concerning restitution or that 
defendant would be subject to the imposition of restitution as part of the sentence. 
3
 Although the hearing below was not an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
entered findings of fact (see R. 33-34, addendum E). 
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7. That there is no record indicating that the court advised the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(R. 34, addendum E). The district court entered the following conclusions of law: 
1. That there is an adequate and sufficient factual basis set forth in the Affidavit 
of Defendant for the plea of guilty. 
2. That there is an adequate and sufficient description of the factual elements 
of the offense set forth in the Affidavit of Defendant for the plea of guilty. 
3. That by defendant executing the Affidavit of Defendant he acknowledged 
that he understood the maximum sentence to which he would be subject and that 
sentencing would be the decision of the court notwithstanding any recommendations 
that may be made. 
4. That there has been compliance with Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and defendant[']s Motion should be denied. 
(R. 34-35, addendum E). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The threshold issue in this appeal is the effect of defendant's 12-year delay in filing 
his motion to withdraw. Because his dilatoriness has prejudiced the State's ability to respond 
to his appeal and to retry him should that become necessary, his claim is barred by the equitable 
doctrine of laches. 
Furthermore, State v. Emig dictates that defendant, having delayed filing his motion 
for a new trial for 12 years, must bear the risk of loss. This placement of the burden is 
consistent with general appellate principles, which place on the appellant the burden of providing 
5 
a complete record on appeal. Since defendant's claims all depend upon demonstrating what 
was not said in the plea colloquy, the absence of a transcript defeats his appeal. 
2. Analyzing defendant's claims under the limited record before this Court, it is apparent 
that none has merit. Since defendant's guilty plea pre-dates State v. Gibbons, substantial 
compliance with rule 11 is all that is required. 
Defendant claims that the court failed to expressly find that he understood the nature 
and elements of the offense. This claim is defeated by State v. Miller, which holds that 
the absence of a finding is not critical so long as the record as a whole establishes that defendant 
understood the consequences of his plea. Defendant's plea affidavit satisfies this requirement. 
Defendant claims that he was not warned that restitution might be imposed. This claim 
fails because in 1982 the Board of Pardons lacked authority to impose restitution; it could 
only consider whether a prospective parolee had made or was prepared to make restitution. 
Defendant does not claim that the law required the court to warn him of every possible factor 
the Board might consider in determining parole. Hence, this claim fails. 
Defendant claims he had a right to be personally advised that any recommendation as 
to sentence was not binding on the court. Since the plea affidavit recites this fact, substantial 
compliance with rule 11 was achieved. 
Defendant claims that the court could not look to the probable cause statement for a 
factual basis for his plea, but is limited to the plea affidavit. State v. Hoff holds otherwise. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY HIS 12-YEAR DELAY IN 
CHALLENGING HIS GUILTY PLEA AND THE INTERVENING 
DESTRUCTION OF THE REPORTER'S NOTES OF THE HEARING 
The threshold question in this case is whether defendant's challenge to his guilty 
plea is barred by his own inaction and intervening events. The district court did not 
resolve this claim on this ground. However, "[i]t is well-settled that an appellate court 
may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court 
relied on some other ground." Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995); State 
v. S.V., 906 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1995); Doe v. V.H., 894 P.2d 1285, 1288 
(UtahApp. 1995). 
A. Defendant's claim is barred by laches. 
There is no dispute that defendant waited 12 years after pleading guilty to move to 
withdraw that plea.4 His motion was prompted by the Board of Pardons' refusal to 
grant him parole despite the fact that he had completed his concurrent federal prison 
term (R. 65). On these facts, his claim is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. 
4
 In 1983 the 30-day time limit on motions to withdraw guilty pleas had not yet been 
imposed. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (1980) ("A plea of not guilty may 
be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of court.") with Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1989) ("A request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be 
made within 30 days after the entry of the plea."). 
7 
"Laches bars a recovery when there has been a delay by one party causing a 
disadvantage to the other party . . . Laches has two elements: (1) lack of diligence on 
the part of the claimant and (2) an injury to the defendant because of the lack of 
diligence.* Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 
P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990) (citing Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping 
Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975)). In Plateau Mining, the court 
reached the merits of the laches argument even though, as here, the trial court did not 
decide the issue. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently recognized that "the equitable doctrine of 
laches is available to dismiss untimely writs." Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 
904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995) (referring specifically to writs of certiorari and 
mandamus). However, no Utah decision has yet applied the doctrine of laches in the 
context of a guilty plea withdrawal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit has, however. It noted that federal law "provides a flexible, equitable time 
limitation based on laches to prevent movants from withholding their claims so as to 
prejudice the government both in meeting the allegations of the motion and in any 
possible retriaL" United States v. Gutierrez, 839 F.2d 648, 651 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2255) (finding that 
8 
government's affidavits made a prima facie showing of prejudice, but remanding for 
further proceedings because that defendant was denied the opportunity to be heard). 
Defendant here has certainly exhibited a "lack of diligence" in bringing his 
motion, having waited 12 years to do so. This Court should hold as a matter of law 
that a lapse of 12 years, with the ensuing loss of hearing notes, prejudices the State 
both in meeting the allegations of the motion and in any possible retrial. Obviously, 
here, the intervening destruction of reporter's notes of a plea hearing creates a high 
potential of prejudicing the State in meeting a defendant's motion to withdraw, 
especially in a case, unlike the case at bar, where a defendant testifies at the plea 
withdrawal hearing in support of his motion. Moreover, there can be no doubt that a 
delay of over 12 years necessarily prejudices the State in retrying a defendant. "Delay 
is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime 
and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may fade . . . 
And it is the prosecution which carries the burden of proof." State v. Trqfhy, 799 P.2d 
704, 706 (Utah 1990) (quoting Barber v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)). 
Accordingly, defendant's conviction should be affirmed on the ground that his 
challenge to his guilty plea is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. 
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B. Defendant's claim is barred by the loss of the notes of the plea hearing. 
Defendant correctly noted in the district court that one of the issues in this case is 
who should bear the risk of loss where, 12 years after the guilty plea was entered, the 
court reporter's "notes have been destroyed and the transcript can no longer be 
generated" (R. 59).5 
In fact, defendant made no record on this issue in the district court. No evidence, 
either live testimony or affidavit, was presented on the question of the disappearance of 
the reporter's notes. The record does not reflect who destroyed the notes, when they 
were destroyed, or why they were destroyed. Nor was there any discussion on the 
record of attempts to reconstruct the record. Perhaps after 12 years all parties 
considered such an attempt futile. 
The district court made no ruling on the legal implications of the destruction of ihe 
reporter's notes during the period of defendant's inaction. It found merely that the 
extant record demonstrates compliance with rule 11(e) and that there was no reason to 
believe that the original guilty plea was not properly taken (see R. 34-35, 70). 
Nevertheless, the burden on appeal cannot be properly allocated without reference to 
the destroyed notes. 
5
 Defendant made no claim below, nor does he make any claim on appeal, that the 
absence of a transcript of the plea proceeding violates his state or federal constitutional 
rights (see R. 21-23, Br. of Aplt. at 5-8). 
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Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1985), holds that an appellant bears the 
risk of the loss of a trial record during a period of delay attributable to the appellant. 
Emig was arrested in Utah as a fugitive from justice based on charges filed against him 
in the State of Colorado. He challenged his incarceration and extradition by writ of 
habeas corpus. Id. at 1045. The trial court denied the petition, and Emig appealed and 
ordered a transcript. Id. 
For sixteen months, Emig did nothing except seek six extensions of time for filing 
his brief. Id. When the Court noticed the matter up for dismissal, Emig's counsel for 
the first time contacted the court reporter, who then informed counsel that she was 
unable to locate the notes of the habeas hearing. Id. at 1045-46. Finally, nineteen 
months after the hearing, the trial court approved a statement of facts for use on appeal, 
but did so without the benefit of assistance from defendant's trial counsel. Id. at 1046. 
On appeal, Emig argued that loss of the reporter's notes and inadequate 
procedures for settling the record denied him his state constitutional right to appeal. Id. 
at 1048. In a unanimous opinion, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the challenge on 
the ground that "[a]ny difficulty in reconstructing the . . . record was due, in large 
part, to the nineteen-month delay between the habeas hearing and the record 
reconstruction hearing." Id. The court continued, "Had Emig or his counsel acted 
vigilantly, the loss could have been discovered earlier and the reconstruction hearing 
11 
held much closer in time to the initial hearing, thus reducing the likelihood of memory 
loss." Id. at 1049. "Under these circumstances," the Court concluded, "Emig and his 
counsel must take responsibility for any difficulties arising from reconstruction of the 
record . . . " Id. at 1049. The court then proceeded to test Emig's claims against a 
record reconstructed without the benefit of defense counsel's recollections. Id.6 
Importantly, the Emig court did not focus on causation. Emig's dilatoriness did 
not cause the reporter to lose her notes. Rather, the issue is allocation of risk: when an 
appellant's inaction halts the progress of the litigation, and during the ensuing delay the 
reporter's notes are destroyed through the fault of neither party, who bears the risk? 
Like most courts who have considered the question, the Utah Supreme Court 
reasonably allocated the risk to the party causing the delay.7 
6
 State v. Turtle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985), employs similar analysis in dicta in the 
criminal context. Tuttle escaped from custody after filing his notice of appeal, 
prompting the Court to dismiss his appeal. Id. at 704. When Tuttle was apprehended 
and returned to prison, the Court reinstated his appeal. Id. It rejected a rule that 
would "routinely" or "automatically" refuse to reinstate appeals of fugitives who have 
been returned to custody. Id. at 704-05. However, it concluded "that a criminal 
appeal dismissed after escape may be reinstated unless the State can show that it has 
been prejudiced by the defendant's absence and the consequent lapse of time. No such 
showing was made here; therefore, the appeal is reinstated." Id. at 705 (emphasis 
added). 
7
 For example, many courts have held that a defendant effectively forfeits his appeal 
if the stenographic record of trial is lost or destroyed while the defendant is a fugitive 
before sentencing or after sentencing but before appeal. See, People v. Everett, 21A 
(continued...) 
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Placing this burden on the appellant is also consistent with the settled rule that the 
appellant bears the burden of ensuring a complete record on appeal. See State v. 
Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988) (per curiam); State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 
307, 309 (Utah 1985); Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). Where an appellant fails to provide 
an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing court presumes the regularity of 
proceedings below. Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Placing the burden on defendant is decisive. Defendant's challenges all depend 
upon what was not said in the plea colloquy. Without a transcript, defendant cannot 
establish what was or was not said. Accordingly, this Court must presume the 
regularity of the plea proceeding and affirm. 
7(...continued) 
Cal. Rptr. 429 (App. 4th Dist. 1990); People v. Valdez, 187 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Ct. App. 
2d Dist. 1982); State v. Brown, 866 P.2d 1172 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 865 
P.2d 1197 (N.M. 1993); State v. Jones, 643 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 1994); State v. 
Lundahl, 882 P.2d 644, 647 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
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POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE BY REFERENCE 
TO THE INFORMATION, PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT, AND 
PLEA AFFIDAVIT THAT HIS 1983 GUILTY PLEA SUBSTANTIALLY 
VIOLATED RULE 11 
Defendant claims on appeal that his guilty plea was deficient in four particulars, see 
Br. of Aplt. at 6, each of which will be addressed below. However, all four claims share 
several deficiencies. 
First, defendant's claims are all couched in terms of an inadequate record. However, 
any such inadequacy is, as demonstrated above, chargeable to defendant. Since defendant 
cannot, without a complete record, demonstrate the omissions he now asserts, all four claims 
must fail. However, the converse is not true: if the papers before this Court establish substantial 
compliance with rule 11, defendant's claim fails on the merits. 
Strict compliance with rule 11 is not required here. Defendant's plea pre-dated State 
v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). The pre-Gibbons rule "required reviewing courts 
to uphold guilty pleas as long as the record as a whole demonstrated 'substantial compliance' 
with constitutional and procedural requirements." Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 
(Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119,1123-24 (Utah 1991)). The substantial 
compliance rule has not, however, "validated all pre-Gibbons pleas." Hoff, 814 P.2d at 
1125. "When there has been a significant departure from Rule 11 requirements which led 
to considerable doubt as to whether a defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary," the 
14 
Utah Supreme Court has allowed the plea to be withdrawn. Id. (citing State v. Breckenridge, 
688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983)). 
Second, defendant had an opportunity to make a record in the district court below. 
Defendant did not testify in support of his motion to withdraw his plea. He did not testify 
that he misunderstood the nature and elements of the offense; he did not testify that he was 
unaware that restitution could be imposed as a condition of parole; he did not testify that 
he did not understand that recommendations as to sentence were not binding on the court 
(or even that any such recommendations were made); and he did not testify that an adequate 
factual basis was not developed on the oral record. 
Nor did defendant testify that any of these alleged omissions resulted in prejudice; for 
example, he does not claim that he would have proceeded to trial had he been properly advised 
of the consequences of pleading guilty. Mere violation of rule 11 without ensuing harm 
does not void a plea knowingly and voluntarily entered. State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294,1301 
(Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., plurality opinion joined by two justices in this part); accord 
United States v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir. 1990); Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 11(h). 
Accordingly, the absence of a transcript of the plea hearing, as well as defendant's 
failure to offer any proof in the hearing on his motion, bar his claim. However, each lacks 
substantial merit as well. 
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A. Nature and elements of the offense. 
Defendant claims that the taking of his plea violated rule 11 (e)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, because "the record is deficient in showing that the court has made a finding 
that appellant understood those elements." Br. of Aplt. at 7. Defendant concedes that the 
elements of aggravated robbery are adequately outlined in the Affidavit of Defendant; he 
argues only that the record fails to establish mat the plea court affirmatively found that defendant 
understood them. Id. 
This claim rests upon a premise expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. That 
court held that "the absence of a finding under [section 77-35-11] is not critical so long as 
the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant entered his plea with full 
knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of the rights he was waiving." State 
v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986). 
The record as a whole here shows "substantial compliance" with rule 11(e)(4). At 
the time of defendant's plea, that rule provided, "The court. . . shall not accept such a plea 
until the court has made the findings: . . . [t]hat the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e)(4) 
(1982) (rule 11(e)(4)). 
As defendant concedes, the plea affidavit adequately states the elements of the offense. 
Moreover, in it defendant swears, "I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me 
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by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents" (R. 12, addendum B). Defendant's 
counsel further certifies, "I know that [defendant] has read the Affidavit, or that I have read 
it to him, and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the meaning of its 
contents." (R. 12, addendum B). 
Defendant's stated understanding of the elements of his crime establishes substantial 
compliance with rule 11(e)(4). 
B. Restitution. 
The Board of Pardons has imposed restitution in the amount of $66,000 (R. 65). 
Defendant complains that the "record is deficient in demonstrating that he knew that such 
restitution could be made part of any sentence." Br. of Aplt. at 7.8 This claim fails because 
defendant has not established that restitution imposed as a condition of parole is part of the 
sentence. 
Rule 11(e)(5) requires that the court ascertain "[t]hat the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e)(5) 
(1982) (rule 11(e)(5)). In 1982 the Board of Pardons had no authority to impose restitution 
"as part of any sentence." Statutory law merely required the Board to consider whether 
8
 Defendant does not here claim that imposing restitution as a condition of parole 
exceeds the Board's statutory or constitutional authority. However, various aspects of 
this question are currently pending before the Utah Supreme Court in Monson v. 
Carver, Case No. 950199 (argued 3 June 1996) and the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Stilling v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, Case No. 950818 (set for argument 17 
June 1996). 
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inmates "have made or are prepared to make restitution . . . as a condition of any parole, 
pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, commutation or termination of sentence." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-3(3) (1982). 
The terms of rule 11 (e)(5) do not require, and defendant does not claim that any controlling 
law requires, notifying defendant of all factors the Board might consider in deciding whether 
to grant parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, commutation, or termination of 
sentence. Certainly, under the parallel federal rule, "a trial court's failure to inform the 
defendant of his parole eligibility is not a basis for withdrawal of a plea on voluntariness 
grounds." United States v. Gutierrez, 839 F.2d 648, 652 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) 
(citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)). Cf. State v. Muldoon, 161 P.2d 16, 19 
(Ariz. 1988) ("Although the acts required to be performed as conditions of probation may 
be onerous, they are not criminal sanctions or sentences. They are opportunities to avoid 
criminal sentencing."). 
Since rule 11 does not require that a defendant be informed of facts related to parole, 
rule 11(e)(5) was not violated and this claim accordingly fails. 
C. Sentence recommendations. 
At the time of defendant's plea, rule 11(e)(6) (now numbered 11(g)(2)) provided: "If 
recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court." Utah Code 
18 
Ann. § 77-35-11(e)(6) (1982). Defendant claims that the record does not reflect that the 
court gave defendant such personal advice. This claim fails for two reasons. 
First, the court's obligation to advise the defendant is conditional, triggered only if 
the court allows recommendations as to sentence. Defendant has not demonstrated, or even 
alleged, that such recommendations were allowed. Hence, the court had no duty to advise 
defendant. 
Second, defendant certified at the time of his plea that he received the required advice. 
In the plea affidavit defendant states, "I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions 
or recommendations or [sic] probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of 
the charges for sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, 
is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by the Judge" (R. 12, addendum B). 
Accordingly, the plea procedure substantially complied with the rule's requirement. 
D. Factual basis. 
Defendant claims that his guilty plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis. 
Br. of Aplt. at 6-7. He states, "Although the Information contains a probable cause statement, 
the Affidavit is inadequate in articulating facts necessary to show an offense of Aggravated 
Robbery." Id. at 8. 
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This claim is squarely controlled by State v. Hoff, which holds that the probable cause 
statement may be considered in determining whether a defendant's plea was supported by 
an adequate factual basis. See 814 P.2d at 1125. 
In Hoff, a pre-Gibbons case, the defendant complained that the plea court failed to develop 
an adequate factual basis for his plea. Id. at 1124. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
conceded that the plea affidavit was "couched largely in the terms of the statutory language 
defining the offense" and did not otherwise "set forth the nature of Hoff s conduct." Id. 
at 1124-25. However, in finding an adequate factual basis, the court relied primarily on 
"a detailed probable cause statement describing the factual basis of the charge . . . " Id. 
at 1125. "Hoff had a copy of the information and did not dispute its contents," the court 
noted. Id. 
Here, the Information included a likewise "detailed" probable cause statement {see 
R. 7-8, addendum A). The Information was read to defendant (R. 4), he presumably received 
a copy, and in neither the district court nor on this appeal has he disputed its contents. 
Accordingly, Hoff controls and defeats this claim. 
* * * 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant's guilty plea 
substantially complied with the requirements of rule 11. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION 
Oral argument would not significantly aid the decisional process in this case. A published 
opinion would contribute incrementally rather than substantially to the body of Utah case 
law. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on / June 1996. T2> 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
sistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were this une 1996 
mailed to the following: 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS. 
RONALD MORELLO 
07/08/47 
aka RONALD LEWIS AESSIO 
Defendant(s). 
(Address/DOB) 
The undersigned William Abbott 
^ 
Issued by: J.P. Soltis 
BAIL: $50,000.00 
Judge 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 
83CRS 
SLCPD 
under oath states on information and belief that the defendant(s) 
committed the crimes of: 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 20 East South 
Temple, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
April 29, 1982, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in 
that the defendant, RONALD MORELLO aka RONALD LEWIS 
AESSt><D, a party to the offense, unlawfully and inten-
tionally took personal property in the possession of 
Allison Van Vranken, from the person or immediate pre-
sence of Allison Van Vranken, against her will, by the 
use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm; 
(continued on page two) 
This information is based 
on evidence obtained from 
the following witnesses: 
J* Evans 
William Abbott 
Allison Van Vranken 
Shari Maynard 
Naoma Tate 
ym£=-^0£ Affiant 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
TEO CANNON 
,,y
 COUNTY ATTORNEY 
U1983 
CIRCUIT COURT 
DEPUTY COUKTY ATTORNEY 
0 0 0 0 0 7 
* +. r rx r. +* 
INFORMATION 
State vs. RONALD MORELLO aka RONALD LEWIS AESSIO 
County Attorney # 83-1-60727 
Page Two 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: Ms. Allison Van Vranken and Ms. 
Shari Maynard are sales clerks at O.C. Tanner, located at 20 
East South Temple, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
On April 28, 1982, a male adult entered the O.C. Tanner store 
and inquired about the purchase of diamonds for his wife. 
He was waited on by Ms. Van Vranken. She was in constant 
contact with this person while she showed him an assortment 
of diamonds while he viewed them under a microscope. No 
diamond purchase occurred at this meeting and he left the 
store. 
On April 29, 1982, this same male individual entered O.C. 
Tanner at approximately 11:00 a.m. and he was waited on by 
Ms. Shari Maynard. He requested the assistance of Allison 
Van Vranken and sat at her counter and waited until she was 
available to assist him. 
At approximately 11:30 a.m. Ms. Van Vranken began assisting 
this person. He asked for the pendant and ring she had shown 
him the day before. He then asked to see a large diamond 
that he had viewed the day before. Ms. Van Vranken required 
this diamond from the store security guard and returned to 
the counter. 
The person then stood up and opened his coat and displayed 
the handle of a pistol tucked in his waistband. He said, 
"Don't scream or I'll shoot; Don*t follow me or I'll shoot; 
Don't follow me, there is a woman in the store and she will 
shoot". He then grabbed the diamonds and exited the store' 
and went into the Kennecott building lobby where he disappeared 
from sight. 
On Monday, March 28, 1983, at approximately 10:00 a.m., 
affiant showed a photo-spread of six photographs to Ms. 
Allison Van Vranken and she positively identified a photograph 
of the defendant as the person who committed the robbery. 
Affiant also showed the same photo spread to Ms. Shari Maynard 
and she also positively identified the defendant* 
FILED 
APR 1 4 1983 
CIRCUIT COURT 
83CRS 
00 0 0 0 8 
Addendum B 
In the District Court of the Third-Judicial District j&Hsafc 
THE STATE OF UTAH. Sfl At L»K6 
U&KJJLJL 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
i (&h*£jt 
Def< 
m 
vit of Defendant 
**w**vtlo
 xyf*gffi&qE3S&&NO. ys-fesr* 
guilty to the charge(s) of: 
under oath, hereby acknowledge that 1 have entered a plea of 
me of Crime) y V Q 
Elements: Facts: 
fr*vKjUv [ ft tntotrtl &&* / If tarn it, frf 
dL£Z- . . . — — 
I have received a cop> of the charge (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a 
(Degree <5f Felonfor Ciasflof Mi sdemeanor) 
and understand the punishment for this crime,may be •)rx<iL£ ^ w 
prison term ID . Pi?TJ fine, or both. 1 am not on drugs or alcohol. 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney 
who has explained my rights to me and I understand them. W fey qgqpu &, 
1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which 1 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial. 1 have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if 1 choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose 
to do so. 
5. 1 know that under the constitution of Utah that if 1 were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that 1 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
proceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
7. I Also know that if 1 am on probation, p*rok< or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive scntcflcyg teing
 y 
imposed on me. ' 0 0 U C A I 
Jm I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of guilty does not mean tnat tne juage win noi impuiccimu a m.v 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case numbers) or count(s)): 
ilVbc dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be filed i wilM>e e(s)Vfc against me for other crimes I may have committed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10. I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and i know and understand its contents. 1 
*' vears of ace have attended school throueh the ™ anH J can read and am .years of age, have attended school through the, 
understand the English language. 
Dated this Zo . dav of .wEL. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me in Court this 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTOR 
7 ^ 
CAuLULytUtfln I certify that 1 am the attorney for f ^ f i\AJC&~ \ w\^ir\fl/j(^)
 % t^e defendant named above and I know he 
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him, and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate anfl true. 
f Defend Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations arl true and accurate, 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for th^pl^a off/fed, and that accepunce of the plea 
would serve the public interest. 
i2k2£^%)defendant. 
No improper 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and volunurily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. . P 
Done in Court this *-& day of / ^V^i , 19 . ^ 
Addendum C 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney,,-'' 
By: ROGER S. BLAYLOCK 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff 
) 
vs 
) 
RONALD MORELLO 
) 
Defendant 
On the 20th day of May, 1983, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
appeared Thomas P. Vuyk, the attorney for the State of Utah, and the 
defendant appeared in person and by counsel, Nancy Bergeson. 
The Court having asked if the defendant has anything to say why judgment 
should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown 
or appearing to the Court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah 
State Prison for the indeterminate term of not less than five years and which 
may be for life, and is not fined as provided by law for the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted. Such sentence shall run concurrently with the federal 
sentence the defendant is presently serving. Commitment shall issue forthwith. 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
Case No. CR-83-658 
000013 
IT IS ORDERED that N. D. Hayward, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, take the said defendant, Ronald Morello, and deliver said defendant 
without delay to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, where said defendant 
shall then and there be confined and imprisoned in accordance with this 
Judgment and Commitment. 
DATED this JZ day of June, 1983. 
^ ^ -r BY THE COURT 
ATTEST 
H.blXONH»NuUV v**—^?^^c„ 
HOMER F. WILKINSON, Judge 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-18-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended 1980, and in accordance with the guidelines developed conjointly 
between the Courts and the Board of Pardons, I recommend that the defendant 
serve months prior to release or parole. 
Imprisonment is ordered in deviation from the guidelines because: 
Comments, including mitigating or aggravating circumstances: 
DATED this / 3 day of June, 1983. 
BY THE COURT 
C^yflOMER F. WILKINSON, Judge 
000014 
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Addendum D 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-1616 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AMENDED MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
: GUILTY PLEA 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Case No. 831906581 FS 
RONALD MORELLO, : Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendant. : 
RONALD MORELLO, by and through his attorney, JOSEPH C. FRATTO, 
JR., herein amends defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
alleges as follows: 
1. That on May 20, 1983, defendant entered a plea of guilty 
to the offense of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the first degree, 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, a judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
2. That defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term at 
the Utah State Prison of not less than five (5) years nor more than 
life, which term of imprisonment was to run concurrently with a 
federal sentence which had previously been imposed on defendant. 
1 
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3. That the federal sentence aforesaid, has been terminated 
and defendant is currently at the Utah State Prison with a parole 
date of 2008. 
4. That a record of the allocution, in open court, during 
the hearing wherein defendant entered his plea of guilty, no longer 
exists as the notes from the court reporter have been destroyed by 
the court clerk's office and, consequently, no transcript of 
proceedings can be produced. 
5. That a copy of the Affidavit of Defendant, executed in 
open court on the date of the entry of the plea, aforesaid, is 
attached as Exhibit A and Incorporated herein. 
6. That defendant has been informed by the Utah Board of 
Pardons that substantial restitution in connection with his 
conviction has been imposed and he will be required to pay said 
restitution. 
7. That the files and records of the Court regarding the 
entry of defendant's plea, as aforesaid, are inadequate and fail to 
show compliance with Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
in that there is no factual basis in the record for the plea of 
guilty; the factual elements of the offense were not explained in 
taking the guilty plea so that defendant understood and admitted 
those elements; the defendant knew that restitution could be 
Imposed as part of any sentence or penalty and that defendant was 
not advised "personally" that any recommendation as to sentence is 
not binding on the court. 
2 
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WHEREFORE, defendant prays that his plea of guilty, heretofore 
entered, be and the same vrithdravm and the matter set for trial. 
DATED this , 1995, 
for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Delivered a copy of the foregoing AMENDED MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA to the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office, 231 
East 400 South Suite #300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this .5 
day of Qtfyfa/f 1995. 
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In the District court oi trie liurppjuaiciai uisin 
THE STATE OF UTAH. Stt^ *"* J
 ft~ * • 
Plaintiff _.»\ l /o 0 W* 
/p-' vs., . "7 y&jtl&Mvj&zvit of Defendant 
1
 l±£h*£Sz.—rVltuXM
 u n d e r oa th< h e r e b y a c k n o w i e d g e t h a t i tave entered a plea of 
guilty to the charges) of: 
.. (k&M<t<\trTi4< KL£S.»^+ A* JFJSIXZ ( / ' ) dUff* f<J&4i^* 
°0 (Name of Crime) » V Q 
Elements: Facts: 
I have rtceived a copy of the charge (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a 
TfrMf Difi^SSA- UJIAMA • 
(Degree of Felony or Claswof Misdemeanor) 
and understand the punishment for this crime,may be •£- '±£-^ ri iVM f^r 
. _ _ — « prison term.. 
fine, or both. 1 am not on drugs or alcohol. 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney OlxMJr I&JQLI* I '}4^u—1 P 
who has explained my righu to me and i understand them. £) ^ 
1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which 1 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial. 1 have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must pr0ve each and every element of the crime charged 
beyond 4 reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
< t taow thMt under the constitution th*t th*ve* right not to pve evidence *g*inst myself*ndth*t this means cAac 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless 1 choose 
to do so. 
5. 1 know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were trieq and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if 1 could not afford to pay the costs for su%h appeal that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been 
convicted
 0r to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present Action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. 0 0 0 0 2 4 
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of guilty does not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me. to-wit: (Court case numbers) or count(s)): 
IIL A»£JU^ ur>9f HJ+ / - £0,+ (A\t%\\ \]'(r (,(k/t sacoui^c^ftT.L 
Jvrr 
ilflbe di 
jfJMhflf/, ItUHttoi 
r/y^MnAJtMJ •kin? 
iar«e(s)%il 
i AJ^JLO j^Mss-hs* (sigh/I*^. 
w fo ismissed, and that no other ch rge  V^ ill be Hied against me for other crimes 1 may have committed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10. I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me bv my attorney, and 1 know and understand its contents. I 
_Z2 vears of ace. have attended school throueh the ^ and I can read and am .y g g . 
understand the English language. 
Dated this 1^ . day of .o2i_ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me in Court this. J-
Defendant 
.day of 
7 ^ 
^t*y 
Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTOR 
trujjL^yK^lo I certify that I am the attorney far N^ . , the defendant named above and I know he 
has read the Affidavit, or that 1 have read it to him, and 1 discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true. 
J Defend Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for th 
would serve the public interest. 
J2Lot£h 'defendant. 
true and accurate. No improper 
defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
offered, and that acceptance of the plea 
Prosecuuag Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. . ~ 
Done in Coun this . day of 
^ A 
T District Judge 0 0 0 C 2 5 
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Addendum E 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-1616 
RLESKSTSSTCSUST 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 5 1995 
f\ SAU t*K£ COUNTY**^  
a, / .Vjrj : r^y-^ 
UtyJVj C»«rk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD MORELLO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 831906581 FS 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The defendant's Amended Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea came on 
for hearing before the Court on the 24th of August, 1995; the State 
of Utah was represented by Chief Deputy District Attorney, WALTER 
R. ELLETT; the defendant was present and represented by \it& 
attorney, JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.; and the court having reviewed the 
files and records herein and having heard argument from counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant, RONALD MORELLO, entered a plea of guilty 
to the offense of aggravated robbery, a felony of the First Degree, 
before this court on May 20, 1983. 
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2. That defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term at 
the Utah State Prison of not less than five (5) nor more than life; 
and defendant is schedule for parole in 2008. 
3. That the Board of Pardons has set restitution in 
connection with defendant's commitment, as recoupment for the value 
of property stolen, at approximately sixty-six thousand dollars 
($66,000). 
4. That the record of the allocution in open court during 
the hearing, wherein defendant entered his plea of guilty, no 
longer exists as the notes from the court reporter have been 
destroyed by the court clerks office. Consequently, no transcript 
of proceedings can be produced. 
5. That the Affidavit of Defendant, executed by defendant 
before the court on the date the plea was entered is available and 
has been reviewed by the court. 
6. That there is no record of any discussion concerning 
restitution or that defendant would be subject to the imposition of 
restitution as part of the sentence. 
7. That there is no record indicating that the court advised 
the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is 
not binding on the court. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That there is an adequate and sufficient factual basis 
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set forth in the Affidavit of Defendant for the plea of guilty. 
2. That there is an adequate and sufficient description of 
the factual elements of the offense set forth in the Affidavit of 
Defendant for the plea of guilty. 
3. That by defendant executing the Affidavit of Defendant he 
acknowledged that he understood the maximum sentence to which he 
would be subject and that sentencing would be the decision of the 
court notwithstanding any recommendations that may be made* 
4. That there has been compliance with Rule 11(e), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and defendants Motion should be denied. 
DATED this ^^ day of s&jz^^?*' , 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as/Tto form: 
Chief' Deputy UTStrict Attorney 
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Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 5 1995 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-1616 
* > • 
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U t i l M Ue?o;y Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD MORELLO, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 831906581 FS 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The defendant's Amended Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea came on 
before the Court on the 24th day of August, 1995. The Court having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and does now enter the following Order and Judgment: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
000036 
That the Amended Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea of the 
defendant, Ronald Morello, be and the same is hereby denied. 
DATED this X day of ,s^U~* . 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
/JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
ict Attorney 
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Addendum G 
77-86-11 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist of reading 
the indictment or information to the defendant or stating to him the sub-
stance of the charge and calling on him to plead thereto. He shall be given 
a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon to plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional time in 
which to plead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time may be granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any proceeding 
provided for by statute or these rules prior to arraignment shall be specifi-
cally and expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered or the 
same is waived. 
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own recognizance, 
prior to arraignment and thereafter fails to appear for arraignment or 
trial when required to do so, a warrant of arrest may issue and bail may 
be forfeited. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-10, enacted by L. 22CJS Criminal Law 11404,407,411. 
1980, eh. 14, {1 . 21 AmJur 2d 716-722, Criminal Law 
Croat Reference! ¥¥ " ^ 
Harmless error, 77-85-30. Admiaaibility of confeesion at affected by 
Rights of accused, Const Art I, H 7-13; £ • * •» arraignment of priaoner, 19 ALR 2d 
77-1-6. 1 8 3 L 
Discharge, suspension, or remission of bail 
Collateral References. by reason of imprisonment of principal for a 
Criminal Law <*=> 261(1), 263,264. different offense, 4 ALR 2d 440. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Xffect of failure to gire time to plead. have been stolen, it was equivalent of a new 
Where original information did not atate J * ' 0 ™ * ? 0 * / ^ u i r , i n *
 k
A r r f i g D m / n \ o f 
public offense and was amended so as * ^ £ £ t i W W t . ^ W ' S 
state public offense for first time, as amend-
 w c h i n f o r m t t i o n , court committed reversible 
ing information in larceny prosecution so as
 t rror . $ u t e v, Jensen (1934) 83 U 452,30 P 2d 
to allege ownership of property alleged to 203. 
77-S5-11. Rule 11 — Pleas, (a) Upon arraignment, except in ease of 
an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the 
defendant waives counsel in open court, and shall not be required to plead 
until he has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or no contest If a defend-
ant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court 
shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the 
court 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forth-
with be set for trial. Defendants unable to make bail shall be given a pref-
erence for an early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise the 
defendant, or his counsel, of the requirements for making a written 
demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and 
shall not accept such a plea until the court has made the findings: 
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(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he has know-
ingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory self-in-
crimination, to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reason-
able doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence 
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed 
to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be approved by 
the court If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the court, the 
court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as 
to sentence is not binding on the court 
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative 
plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in 
the expectation that other charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, 
upon request of the parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such ten-
tative agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of the time for 
tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney 
and defense counsel whether he will approve the proposed disposition. 
Thereafter, if the judge decides that final disposition should not be handled 
in conformity with the plea agreement, he shall so advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea. 
History: C. 1953, 77*35-11, enacted by L. tnee of the court and counsel, to establish the 
1960, eh. 14, § 1. voluntariness of defendant's guilty plea was 
Failure to explain consequences of plea. n o t proscribed by this rale. Lindeman v. 
Where trial court did not explain to jove- M o r ™ t1982) 641P 2d 183. 
nile, who was represented by his father but „ „ • » # 
not by an attorney, that the charges against Ceueterai Kereremee*. 
him were felonies, what a felony is or the Criminal Law * » 267*275. 
consequences to the juvenile from a convic- 22 CJS Criminal Law f § 414-425. 
tion of a felony, juvenile was entitled to a AmJur 2d 727 et eeqn Criminal Law 
withdraw his plea of guilty to the felony {44301 tea 
charges and to have his conviction thereon ^ '
 m „ 
set aside and to stand trial. Bute in Interest Appeal plea of guilty in police, magistrate, 
of Hill (1980) 621 P 2d 705. municipal or similar inferior court as pre-
Method of establishing voluntariaees ef chiding appeei, 42 ALR 2d 995. Assist nc  of counsel, adequacy of defense 
Trial court's acceptance and reliance upon counsel's representation of criminal client 
defendant's affidavit, executed in the pres- regarding guilty pleas, 10 ALR 4th 8. 
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